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1. Introduction 
Recent studies on regional trade agreements (RTAs) employ trade data according 
to tariff schemes such as RTA schemes or most-favored-nation (MFN) schemes. 
Traditionally, RTAs have been empirically investigated by employing regular trade data, 
i.e., trade data that cannot differentiate between tariff schemes. Such studies have 
mainly examined the existence of trade creation effects arising from RTAs.1 More 
recently, on the other hand, trade researchers have started to employ product-level trade 
data according to tariff schemes. In particular, such studies show that not all exporters 
necessarily utilize RTA schemes even when exporting to RTA partner countries. 2 
Furthermore, prior studies have also examined the determinants of preferential trade 
utilization rates and found that the utilization rates are higher for products with a larger 
preference margin (i.e., difference between MFN rates and preference rates), larger 
trade volumes, and less restrictive rules of origin (RoOs).3 Namely, these studies have 
obtained interesting findings that have yet to be clarified in traditional studies 
employing regular trade data. 
Along with this trend in empirical analysis on RTAs, some theoretical studies 
have examined exporters’ choice of tariff schemes while keeping settings for importers 
as simple as possible. For example, Demidova and Krishna (2008) introduce exporters’ 
choice of tariff schemes into the firm-heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003). They 
assume that exporters need to pay additional variable and fixed costs to utilize RTA 
schemes. Such variable costs arise owing to the need to adjust procurement sources so 
as to comply with RoOs. Fixed costs for RTA utilization are assumed to be 
administrative costs for collecting required documents, including a list of inputs, a 
production flow chart, production instructions, invoices for each input, and contract 
documents. By incurring these costs, RTA users can utilize RTA schemes, which provide 
lower tariff rates than MFN schemes. Under these settings, they theoretically 
demonstrate that more productive exporters use RTA schemes to a greater extent than 
less productive exporters. The latter type of exporters make less use of MFN schemes 
because they cannot earn sufficient operating profits to cover the fixed costs for RTA 
utilization. A similar theoretical model is also developed in Cherkashin et al. (2015). 
In contrast to these theoretical studies that consider RTA utilization from the 
                                                   
1 Some studies using such trade data include those by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Magee 
(2006). 
2 Also, several other studies investigated the effects of preferential utilization on prices and found 
export prices rise after RTA schemes are utilized. Those include studies by Bureau et al. (2007), 
Cadot et al. (2006), Francois et al. (2006), Manchin (2006), and Hakobyan (2015). 
3 Examples are Cadot et al. (2005), Olarreaga and Ozden (2005), Ozden and Sharma (2006), and 
Cirera (2014). 
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export side, trade data according to tariff schemes are usually available from the import 
side. This reflects the fact that data on RTA utilization for export is technically difficult 
to obtain. In the case of imports, RTA utilization data can usually be obtained from 
customs records. Those data are obtained from the issuance of certificates of origin 
(CoOs) in the case of exports.4 However, when a self-certification system is adopted,5 
there is no way of knowing the tariff scheme used by the exporter since CoOs 
information is retained by the exporting companies. Furthermore, exporters do not 
necessarily export products under RTA schemes even after they have obtained CoOs. 
Thus, export-side data based on the issuance of CoOs are likely to overestimate the true 
value of RTA exports. Therefore, as in the case of regular trade data, import-side data 
are believed to be more accurate than export-side data regarding RTA scheme use. 
In order to better link the empirical analysis with the theoretical model, it is 
important to develop a model that can shed light on the role of importers’ characteristics 
in RTA utilization. There are two main reasons. First, it seems difficult to empirically 
investigate variables specified in the exporter-side model. For example, as shown in 
Demidova and Krishna (2008), such a model elucidates the significant contribution of 
exporters’ productivity to their choice of tariff schemes. Therefore, at a product-level, 
preference utilization rates will be closely related to export-side variables such as 
average export values among exporters. On the other hand, we can empirically examine 
the size of “import transactions” because preference eligibility is set at a tariff line–level 
for importing countries and it is difficult to obtain trade data at such a level from the 
exporting country’s side.6 As a result, export values are measured by annual import 
values (e.g., Hakobyan, 2015), the monthly average of import values (e.g., Hayakawa 
and Laksanapanyakul, 2016), the customs district-level monthly average of import 
values (e.g., Keck and Lendle, 2012), or the average of firm-level import values (e.g., 
Hayakawa et al., 2014). Obviously, these measures are not necessarily consistent with 
the average of firm-level export values, particularly when country–product–level 
matching of exporters and importers is not one-to-one. 
Second, it is difficult to conduct a detailed analysis on RTA utilization without 
specifying the role of importer characteristics. As mentioned above, firm-level empirical 
analyses are possible only when we investigate each importer’s utilization of RTA 
                                                   
4 One notable exception is Cherkashin et al. (2015), who employ firm-level export data on the 
utilization of the Generalized System of Preferences/Program from Bangladesh to Europe and the 
U.S. However, their dataset covers only the apparel industry. 
5 For example, these include NAFTA, the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the U.S.–
Singapore FTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Singapore–New Zealand FTA, the Thailand–New 
Zealand FTA, the Australia–New Zealand FTA, the Mexico–Chile FTA, and the U.S.–Korea FTA. 
6 As is well known, a most detailed internationally comparable level of HS codes is six digits. 
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schemes, not each exporter’s utilization. As introduced in the next section, significant 
differences exist in RTA utilization across importers. In particular, some importers 
utilize only MFN schemes, whereas some importers use only RTA schemes. 
Furthermore, some importers utilize both MFN and RTA schemes despite importing the 
identical product from the same country. However, usual theoretical studies consider 
homogeneous importers and provide no way to explain or rationalize such differences in 
RTA utilization across importers. In other words, the theoretical predictions derived 
from a model that does not consider importers’ heterogeneity cannot serve as a good 
guide to analyze importer’s utilization of RTA schemes. 
Against this backdrop, this paper is an attempt to fill this gap by developing a 
theoretical model of RTA utilization from the importers’ perspective by providing a 
theoretical framework to reveal the link between importers’ characteristics and RTA 
utilization. We also empirically examine the predictions derived from the proposed 
framework. Regarding exporters’ choice of tariff schemes, we follow existing studies 
such as Demidova and Krishna (2008) and Cherkashin et al. (2015). Thus, decisions on 
tariff scheme choices are in the exporters’ hands. However, importers are supposed to be 
heterogeneous in our model and exporters explicitly refer to importers’ characteristics 
when making decisions. Specifically, following Bernard et al. (2015), we assume that 
importers are heterogeneous in terms of productivity and bundle inputs into a final 
product. As a result, not every exporter sells to every buyer in a country. Highly 
productive exporters reach many customers, i.e., importers. In addition, highly 
productive importers buy from many exporters. Since highly productive exporters are 
more likely to utilize RTA schemes, highly productive importers have a higher share of 
import transactions under RTA schemes. This implies that importers with some range of 
productivity have import transactions under both RTA and MFN schemes, which is 
consistent with the above-mentioned fact on importers’ RTA utilization. 
Using this theoretical model, we derive some propositions regarding firm-level 
utilization on RTA schemes in importing. We examine import firm-product-level 
utilization rates on RTA schemes, which are defined as the share of imports under RTA 
schemes in total imports at a firm-product level. Specifically, we derive two main 
propositions. One is that such importer RTA utilization rates are positively correlated 
with importer size, which is captured by imports from the world. The other is that those 
rates are higher when the preference margin is larger. Then, using detailed import data 
for Thailand, we empirically examine the validity of these theoretical propositions. Our 
data for Thailand enable us to identify not only the firm, source country, and commodity 
at a harmonized system (HS) eight-digit level but also the tariff scheme (e.g., RTA or 
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MFN scheme) used by the importing firm. Therefore, this dataset enables us to compute 
RTA utilization rates in importing at a firm-product level. As a result, we will show 
empirical results consistent with the above theoretical predictions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of 
firm-level RTA utilization and presents some evidences. In this section, the significance 
of RTA scheme “partial users” (i.e., importers that use both RTA and MFN schemes), 
which has never been highlighted in the literature, will be pointed out. We provide the 
theoretical model on import firms’ RTA utilization in Section 3 and derive the 
above-mentioned theoretical predictions in Section 4. Those theoretical propositions are 
empirically examined in Section 5. In addition, since almost all previous studies on RTA 
utilization are conducted at the product level, we also derive some theoretical 
predictions on product-level RTA utilization from our theoretical model, which will be 
also empirically tested. Section 6 discusses the implications of our results and concludes 
this paper. 
 
 
2. Stylized Facts 
     This section provides some facts on firm-level RTA utilization. To this end, we 
employ transaction-level import data obtained from the Customs Office of the Kingdom 
of Thailand and cover all commodity imports in Thailand. Our dataset contains customs 
clearing date, HS eight-digit code, exporting country, firm identification code, tariff 
scheme (e.g., RTA or MFN), and import values in Thai Baht (THB). We use data on 
imports aggregated by years in addition to source countries, HS eight-digit codes, firms, 
and tariff schemes. We classify tariff schemes into three categories, namely MFN 
scheme, RTA scheme, and other schemes. Tariff payments for imports under “the other 
schemes” are exempted on the basis of five schemes: bonded warehouses, free zones, 
investment promotion, duty drawback for raw materials imported for the production of 
exports, and duty drawback for re-exportation. 
We first show the number of RTA users in 2008. In that year, Thailand had seven 
RTAs. The first RTA concluded by Thailand was the ASEAN free trade agreement 
(FTA), which entered into force in 1993. It became effective among Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. More countries later joined into this 
FTA (Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999). Thailand 
also has bilateral RTAs with India, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which entered 
into force in 2004, 2007, 2005, and 2005, respectively. In the case of a bilateral RTA 
with India, only the early harvest program (i.e., limited coverage of liberalized products) 
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has been available. The RTA with China, concluded with ASEAN members as the 
ASEAN–China FTA, entered into force in 2005. Except for the bilateral RTA with Japan, 
tariff rates in all RTAs are basically reduced on January 1 every year.7 
Table 1 reports the number/share of import firm-product-level observations 
according to RTA use and export countries. “Product” is defined at an HS eight-digit 
level. The export country-product observations are restricted to those in which RTA 
rates are lower than MFN rates.8 We can immediately see that the majority of importers 
do not use RTA schemes. The highest share of RTA users can be found in the case of 
importing from Indonesia, followed by New Zealand, at 29% and 22%, respectively. In 
terms of absolute numbers, the number of RTA users is outstanding in the case of 
importing from China. While greater than 10,000, its share is 19%. Our finding here can 
be simply summarized as follows. 
 
Stylized Fact 1. Both RTA users and non-users import from RTA partner countries. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     Next, we decompose RTA users into partial users and full users. The former are 
defined as those who import under both MFN and RTA schemes, whereas the latter 
import only under RTA schemes. The number and share of each type are shown in Table 
2. Although the number of full users is larger than that of partial users in most cases, the 
number of partial users is a non-negligible number. For example, the share of partial 
users is around 30% in the cases of Australia, China, India, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. Moreover, it is larger than the share of full users in the case of Japan.9 The 
case of Singapore also reports the relatively high share of partial users (48%). In short, 
there are a significant number of partial users when we examine RTA utilization from 
the viewpoint of importers. This fact has never been revealed in the literature. The 
                                                   
7 More precisely, in the ASEAN–China FTA, tariff rates are reduced not later than January 1. Thus, 
it is unclear exactly when tariff rates are reduced each year. Also, in the early-harvest program of the 
Thailand–India FTA, tariff reduction was completed on September 1, 2006, which is before our 
sample period. 
8 In the case of exports from ASEAN, not only the ASEAN FTA but also the ASEAN–China FTA is 
available. In this case, we restrict our analysis to products in which either/both of these two FTAs 
provide lower preferential rates than MFN rates. 
9 This larger share of partial users may be partly attributable to the timing of tariff reduction in 
RTAs with Japan. Every year, RTA rates are changed on April 1, which is the start date of the 
Japanese fiscal year. Therefore, in the case of the first year of tariff reductions during the phase-in 
period, firms may import under MFN schemes from January to March and then under RTA schemes 
from April. Namely, when the timing of the introduction of RTA tariff rates is different from the 
calendar year, the number of partial users will likely be larger. 
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finding is simply summarized as follows. 
 
Stylized Fact 2. There are both full users and partial users among firms who import 
from RTA partner countries under RTA schemes. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
Finally, we offer an overview of the distribution of firm-product-level RTA 
utilization rates for partial users to show how varied firm-product-level RTA utilization 
rates are in a range of (0, 1). Those rates are computed at a value-basis, i.e., share of 
imports under RTA schemes out of total imports at a firm-product level. The tendency is 
similar across export countries, so we only report the case of Australia.10 Figure 1 
depicts such a distribution in imports from Australia. Note that tariff rates in the case of 
the RTA with Australia are reduced on January 1 every year. The figure shows that the 
density rises with the utilization ratio. In particular, it dramatically rises at around 0.8. 
From these findings, we can see that partial users mainly use RTA schemes rather than 
MFN schemes. 
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
 
3. The Model 
The previous section revealed striking facts on RTA use by Thai importing firms. 
Several recent studies such as those by Demidova and Krishna (2008) and Cherkashin et 
al. (2015) succeeded in replicating the fact that some exporters use RTA schemes and 
others use MFN schemes even among RTA member countries by assuming the existence 
of fixed costs for RTA utilization, which typically represents the documentation cost to 
comply with RoOs. If this cost is significantly high for exporters, exports can be made 
using MFN tariff rates even when exporting to RTA member countries. Here, we 
examine RTA use by importing firms. The above Stylized Facts 1 and 2 suggest that 
some importers use RTA schemes and others use MFN schemes, and there are full and 
partial users among RTA users. These facts cannot be replicated with typical models 
where importers are homogeneous. 
In this section, we develop a theoretical model that replicates those stylized facts 
by assuming both exporters and importers are heterogeneous in their productivity. 
                                                   
10 Figures for other countries are available upon request. 
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Heterogeneity in exporters does not necessarily need to be considered to replicate 
Stylized Fact 1. However, to replicate Stylized Fact 2, it is natural to assume 
heterogeneity not only of importers but also of exporters. As in Bernard et al. (2015), in 
order to replicate the partial use of an RTA scheme, we assume dual heterogeneity in the 
productivity of exporters and importers and provide some empirically testable 
propositions. Setup for other aspects of the model can be briefly described in the 
following manner. Final-good producers combine domestic and imported intermediate 
inputs, produce outputs, and sell them to the representative household in their home 
countries. Thus, final-good producers are importers of intermediate inputs in our model. 
Intermediate-good producers input domestic labor force, produce outputs, and sell them 
to domestic and foreign final-good producers. 
 
3.1. Representative Household 
In the economy, there are 𝐽 countries. The representative household consumes 
varieties of final goods. The utility function of the representative household in the 
country 𝑗 is given by 
𝑈𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗 = �� 𝑐𝑗𝑗𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑑1
0
�
𝜎
𝜎−1        1 < 𝜎 < ∞. 
where 𝑐𝑗 is the consumption index, 𝑐𝑗𝑗 is the consumption amount of the final-good 
variety 𝑑 , and 𝜎  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The demand 
function of each variety is derived as 
𝑐𝑗𝑗 = �𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑗 �−𝜎 𝑐𝑗, 
where 𝑝𝑗𝑗 is the price of each variety, and 𝑃𝑗 is the consumer price index, which is 
defined by 
𝑃𝑗 = �� 𝑝𝑗𝑗1−𝜎𝑑𝑑1
0
�
1
1−𝜎. 
We assume that nominal income 𝑌𝑗 is exogenously endowed and that it is used only for 
final-goods consumption. Thus,  
𝑐𝑗 = 𝑌𝑗𝑃𝑗         and    𝑐𝑗𝑗 = �𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑗 �−𝜎 𝑌𝑗𝑃𝑗 . 
 
3.2. Final-Good Producers (Importers) 
Final-good producers combine domestic and imported intermediate inputs, 
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produce outputs, and sell them to the representative household in their home countries. 
Thus, final-good producers are importers of intermediate inputs in our model. The 
production technology of each final-good producer 𝑑 is represented by the following 
CES aggregator: 
𝑦𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗 �� 𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜅−1𝜅 𝑑𝑑1
0
�
𝜅
𝜅−1        1 < 𝜅 < ∞. 
where 𝜅 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of intermediate goods.11 𝑎𝑗 
is importer-specific productivity. Furthermore, 𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the input index of intermediate 
good 𝑑 and is defined by 
𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �� � �𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)�𝜈−1𝜈 𝑑𝜔
𝜔∈Ω𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖)
𝐽
𝑖=1
�
𝜈
𝜈−1 ,       1 < 𝜈 < ∞, 
where 𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)  is the input amount of intermediate good 𝑑  produced by 
intermediate-good producer 𝜔 in the country 𝑖 , 𝜈  is the elasticity of substitution 
between 𝑑 inputs produced by alternative firms, and Ω𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖) is the set of firms that sell 
intermediate goods to the final-good producer. Cost minimization implies the following 
demand schedules: 
𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔) = �𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗 �−𝜈 𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗     and     𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗𝜅−1 �𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑧𝑗𝑗 �−𝜅 𝑦𝑗𝑗, 
where 
𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �� � �𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)�1−𝜈𝑑𝜔
𝜔∈Ω𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖)
𝐽
𝑖=1
�
1
1−𝜈    and   𝑧𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗−1 �� 𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗1−𝜅𝑑𝑑1
0
�
1
1−𝜅. 
Following Helpman et al. (2008) we assume that 𝑎𝑗 follows a bounded Pareto 
distribution given by 
𝐺𝑎(𝑎) = 1 − (𝑎𝐿)𝛼𝑎−𝛼1 − �𝑎𝐿
𝑎𝐻
�
𝛼 ,      0 < 𝑎𝐿 < 𝑎𝐻, 
where 𝑎𝐿  and 𝑎𝐻 , respectively, represent lower and upper bounds of 𝑎𝑗 . This 
distribution enables us to replicate not only zero trade but also RTA non-, partial-, and 
                                                   
11 We assume that intermediate-good varieties are continuously distributed in [0,1], which indicates 
that the number of those varieties in our model is infinite. In other words, each variety is assumed to 
be small in the input basket so that the price of each variety does not affect the input price index. 
This assumption enables us to derive clear propositions on the effects of the tariff ratio. We believe 
that this assumption is acceptable as the number of varieties in our dataset is 8,300 and each variety 
is supposed to be small enough. 
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full-users in a given product between two particular countries. Following Demidova and 
Krishna (2008), we also assume 𝛼 > 𝜈 . Through profit maximization by each 
final-good producer, the price of each variety 𝑑 is derived as 
𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 𝜎𝜎 − 1 𝑧𝑗𝑗. 
The final-good market clearing condition is given by 
𝑦𝑗𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗𝑗 = �𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑗 �−𝜎 𝑌𝑗𝑃𝑗      or     𝑦𝑗𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗𝜎 � 𝜎𝜎 − 1 �� 𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗1−𝜅𝑑𝑑10 � 11−𝜅 1𝑃𝑗�
−𝜎
𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑗
. 
 
3.3. Intermediate-Good Producers (Exporters) 
Intermediate-good producers input domestic labor force, produce outputs, and sell 
them to domestic and foreign final-good producers. We suppose that production 
technology of each intermediate-good producer 𝜔 follows the simple linear function 
over labor force given by 
𝑜𝑗(𝑖,𝜔) = 𝜑(𝜔)𝑛𝑗(𝑖,𝜔). 
where 𝜑(𝜔) is exporter-specific productivity, and 𝑛𝑗(𝑖,𝜔) is the labor input. We 
assume that 𝜑(𝜔) follows a bounded Pareto distribution given by 
𝐺(𝜑) = 1 − (𝜑𝐿)𝛼𝜑−𝛼1 − �𝜑𝐿
𝜑𝐻
�
𝛼 ,       0 < 𝜑𝐿 < 𝜑𝐻 , 
where 𝜑𝐿  and 𝜑𝐻 , respectively, represent lower and upper bounds of 𝜑(𝜔). The 
marginal cost of each intermediate-good producer is given by 
𝑚𝑐𝑖(𝜔) = 𝑤𝑖𝜑(𝜔), 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the wage rate. 
 
3.4. Choice of Tariff Schemes 
In the model, exporters, i.e., intermediate-good producers, choose a tariff scheme 
such to maximize their sales profits. Sales profits when each intermediate-good 
producer 𝜔 exports to a foreign final-good producer under MFN and RTA schemes, 
respectively, are given by 
𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔) = �?̃?𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔) − 𝑤𝑖𝜑(𝜔)� 𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔) − 𝑓𝑖𝑗 , 
𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) = �?̃?𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔) − 𝑤𝑖𝜑(𝜔)� 𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) − 𝑓𝑖𝑗 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑. 
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where 𝑓𝑖𝑗 is fixed costs for trading. Without loss of generality, we assume that those 
costs are zero for domestic trading (𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 0) for simplicity. 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑 is fixed costs for RTA 
scheme utilization such as documentation preparation cost.12 ?̃?𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔) is the mill price 
and is given by 
?̃?𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔) = 𝜈𝜈 − 1 𝑤𝑖𝜑(𝜔) ≡ ?̃?(𝑖,𝜔). 
Under respective schemes, export prices are represented by 
𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔) = 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗?̃?(𝑖,𝜔) ≡ 𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑀(𝑖,𝜔), 
𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) = 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗?̃?(𝑖,𝜔) ≡ 𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑅(𝑖,𝜔). 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗 is per-unit MFN tariff (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 1), 𝜏𝑖𝑗 is iceberg trade cost (𝜏𝑖𝑗 > 1), 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗 is 
the share of tariff escaped paying under the RTA scheme (1 > 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 0), and 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗 is 
per-unit cost for RTA utilization (𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 1). Specifically, 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗−1 is interpreted as the 
preference margin. We assume 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗 < 1 so that not all exports are undertaken under 
the RTA scheme. To obtain testable hypotheses for the preference margin’s effect on 
RTA utilization rate, we assume 𝜅 = 𝜎 = 𝜈.13 As a result, profits are rewritten as 
𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔) = 𝐴𝑗Φ(𝜔)Ψ𝑖𝑗 � 1𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝜈 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗 , 
𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) = 𝐴𝑗Φ(𝜔)Ψ𝑖𝑗 � 1𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝜈 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑, 
where 
Φ(𝜔) = [𝜑(𝜔)]𝜎−1,   𝐴𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗𝜈−1,   
Ψ𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑗 � 1𝑤𝑖/𝑃𝑗�𝜈−1 (𝜈 − 1)2𝜈−1 � 1𝜏𝑖𝑗�𝜈 �1𝜈�2𝜈 𝑌𝑗𝑃𝑗 . 
                                                   
12 Helpman et al. (2004) and Helpman et al. (2008) assume that exporters pay fixed costs for 
exporting to each destination and do not consider a case where exporters deal with exporting 
processes for multiple destinations at the same time, thus saving the total fixed cost. In other words, 
they do not suppose economies of scale for the fixed costs. Regarding the fixed cost for RTA 
utilization, we simply follow these studies and assume that exporters pay the fixed cost for RTA 
utilization as part of each transaction. Mitigation of those fixed costs through exporters’ learning is 
not considered as the model is static. Although these extensions would lead to richer theoretical 
consequences, we do not examine such cases to keep the model simple and tractable. Furthermore, 
we do not suppose entry and exit of final-good producers into or from international transactions of 
intermediate inputs. This consequence relies on our assumption that the fixed costs for market entry, 
importing, and RTA utilization are zero for final-good producers, i.e., importers. Relaxing this 
assumption does not induce any qualitative changes to our results if importers’ decisions on market 
entry are settled before exporters’ decisions are made. 
13 In our model, the number of countries is assumed to be finite, and time-series changes in the 
preference margin impact the price index. As a result, the effect of the preference margin on the RTA 
utilization rate becomes too complicated to derive clear testable hypotheses. Therefore, we assume a 
simplification assumption, 𝜅 = 𝜎 = 𝜈, and try to obtain clear testable hypotheses. As shown in a 
later section, our theoretical predictions are strongly supported by our empirical investigations. 
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Thus, we find that profits are increasing in importer’s (𝑎𝑗) and exporter’s [𝜑(𝜔)] 
productivity. Furthermore, the difference in profits under MFN and RTA schemes can be 
rewritten as 
𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) − 𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔) = 𝐴𝑗Φ(𝜔)Ψ𝑖𝑗 � 1𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝜈 �� 1𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝜈 − 1� − 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑 . 
This implies that RTAs are more beneficial than MFNs when both exporter and importer 
have higher productivity. 
Taking importer’s productivity as given, we now derive three thresholds for 
exporter productivity. The first and second thresholds, respectively, define ranges of 
exporters that gain positive profits by trading with an importer with productivity 𝑎𝑗 
under MFN and RTA schemes. Respective threshold conditions are given by 
𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔) = 0 and 𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) = 0, which are rewritten as 
𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖) = � 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑗
𝜈−1Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 �
1
𝜈−1    and    𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖) = �𝑓𝑖𝑗 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑎𝑗𝜈−1Ψ𝑖𝑗 (𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗)𝜈�
1
𝜈−1. 
Exporters with productivity above those thresholds can gain positive profits by trading 
with an importer with productivity 𝑎𝑗  under the respective schemes. The third 
threshold defines the range of exporters that gain larger profits under the RTA scheme 
than the MFN scheme. The threshold condition is represented by 𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) =
𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔), which is rewritten as 
𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅≥𝑀(𝑖) = � 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑
𝑎𝑗
𝜈−1Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈(𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗)−𝜈 − 1� 1𝜈−1. 
Thus, exporters with productivity above 𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅≥𝑀(𝑖) prefer RTAs to MFNs to trade with 
an importer with productivity 𝑎𝑗. 
There are two possible cases of tariff scheme use. First, some exporters use an 
RTA scheme to trade with an importer, whereas others use an MFN scheme with that 
same importer when the relative attractiveness of RTA to MFN is not so significant. 
This case happens when 𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖) < 𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖), which can be rewritten as 
�1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑
𝑓𝑖𝑗
�
1
𝜈 > 1
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗
.                                                 (1) 
Following the literature, we call this case the heterogeneous regime. Condition (1) 
implies that the heterogeneous regime appears when (i) fixed costs for RTA utilization 
are sufficiently large relative to those for exporting, (ii) the share of tariffs avoided 
under the RTA scheme is sufficiently low, or (iii) per-unit costs for RTA utilization are 
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sufficiently small. 
Figure 2 graphically demonstrates how the difference in profits under RTA and 
MFN schemes, i.e., 𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖,𝜔) − 𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖,𝜔) , is related to importer and exporter 
productivity in the heterogeneous regime using hypothetical parameter values.14 The 
figure shows that either importer or exporter productivity has to be high so that the RTA 
scheme is employed. In other words, given the distribution of exporter productivity, an 
importer’s share of RTA transactions is supposed to rise with its productivity. This 
implies that more productive importers are likely to have higher RTA utilization rates. In 
the next section, we will formally demonstrate that firm-product-level RTA utilization 
rates are positively associated with importer productivity. Furthermore, Figure 3 
demonstrates a case where the lower-bound productivity of exporters is significantly 
high. In this case, consistent with Stylized Fact 1, we find some importers use only an 
RTA scheme and others use only an MFN scheme even for the same product. 
Furthermore, the figure also shows that there are full and partial users of RTA schemes, 
replicating Stylized Fact 2. 
 
===   Figures 2 and 3   === 
  
All the transactions will use the RTA scheme when Condition (1) does not hold. 
In other words, firms import solely under RTA schemes when (i) fixed costs for RTA 
utilization are sufficiently low compared with those for exporting, (ii) RTA rates are 
sufficiently low compared with MFN rates, or (iii) the restrictiveness of RTA utilization 
is sufficiently weak. This case is referred to as the homogeneous regime. In the 
homogeneous regime, all importers become RTA full users, and partial use of RTA 
schemes does not appear. As our aim is to examine partial use, we rule out the 
homogeneous regime and focus on the heterogeneous regime in our main investigation. 
However, as noted above and demonstrated in Figure 3, RTA full users can appear even 
in the heterogeneous regime when the lower bound of exporters’ productivity is 
sufficiently high. 
 
 
4. Importers’ Characteristics and Firm-Product-Level RTA Utilization 
This section considers how importers’ characteristics are related to 
firm-product-level RTA utilization based on the proposed model. The model assumes 
                                                   
14 Parameter values are chosen so that Equation (1) holds and those values do not contradict 
estimations in existing studies such as Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Cherkashin et al. (2015). 
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that importers are heterogeneous in terms of productivity. However, because of data 
limitations, we cannot directly identify each importer’s productivity. Thus, we consider 
how the “size” of each importer, which is defined as each importer’s total imports of a 
given product from the world and which is observable, is related to RTA utilization. 
 
4.1. Import Firm-Product-Level RTA Utilization 
To be consistent with the above stylized facts, we focus on importers’ RTA 
utilization rates, which are defined as share of imports under RTA schemes out of total 
imports at an import firm-product level. In the model, exporters optimally choose the 
tariff scheme for each international transaction considering not only their own 
productivity but also the importers’ productivity. When the importer is more productive, 
exporters can gain larger profits from exporting in general because a more productive 
importer purchases more from each exporter. Therefore, the more productive exporters 
will export to such importers under RTA schemes because their profits from exporting 
can cover fixed costs arising from RTA utilization. Also, more productive importers will 
import from a larger number of exporters. As a result, importers with sufficiently low 
productivity have transactions only with exporters using MFN schemes, whereas 
importers with sufficiently high productivity trade not only with exporters using MFN 
schemes but also with those using RTA schemes. Trading partners of the more 
productive importers are more likely to be exporters under RTA schemes. In short, 
firm-product-level RTA utilization rates are positively associated with importer 
productivity levels. 
The above assertion on the relationship between importer productivity and 
firm-product-level RTA utilization rates is derived from the fact that more productive 
importers are larger customers for exporters in the sense that they purchase more than 
less productive importers. Furthermore, more productive importers import from a larger 
number of exporters. Thus, it is natural to expect that the extent of total imports of a 
given product from the rest of the world by more productive importers, which we call 
the size of importers, is larger than for those of less productive importers.15 Thus, we 
predict a positive correlation between importer size and the firm-product-level RTA 
utilization rates when importing from a concerned country. We summarize this 
prediction as the following testable proposition:16 
 
Proposition 1. Import firm-product-level RTA utilization rates are higher for 
                                                   
15 Appendix A1 formally proves this prediction. 
16 Proofs of propositions on firm-product-level RTA utilization are shown in Appendix A2. 
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larger-sized importers. 
 
Our theoretical framework also suggests the effect of RTA rates on 
firm-product-level RTA utilization rates. When RTA rates are low relative to MFN rates, 
exporters are supposed to prefer the RTA tariff scheme. In contrast, exporters do not 
perceive the relative attractiveness of the RTA tariff scheme when RTA rates are close to 
MFN rates. Thus, defining the preference margin as the ratio of MFN rates to RTA rates, 
we formally propose this prediction in the following manner: 
 
Proposition 2. Import firm-product-level RTA utilization rates are higher when 
preference margins are larger. 
 
As mentioned in the empirical sections, previous empirical studies have examined the 
role of the preference margin, which is defined as the difference between MFN rates and 
RTA rates. Although our theoretical analysis uses the above-defined ratio as the 
preference margin simply for tractability, these two measures are qualitatively the same.  
We should also emphasize some other characteristics that affect import 
firm-product-level utilization rates. In particular, as noted above, exporters have to 
comply with RoOs when exporting under an RTA scheme. For instance, exporters have 
to prove that the share of the total value of the inputs imported from non-member 
countries is less than a certain percentage (e.g., 40%) of prices in exported products 
when the regional value content (RVC) rule is applied to their exporting products.17 In 
our model, 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗 captures the restrictiveness of RoOs. If the RoOs are more restrictive 
for exporters, more exporters hesitate to use the RTA scheme. As a result, other things 
being equal, RTA utilization rates become lower for each importer when the RTA 
scheme is more restrictive.  
 
4.2. Product-Level RTA Utilization 
Most previous studies examine preference utilization at a product level. Thus, it is 
worth discussing how product-level RTA utilization rates, which are defined as the share 
of imports under RTA schemes out of total imports at a product level, are theoretically 
related to importer characteristics. As counterparts to firm-level productivity in the 
above firm-level analysis, we first examine how the average size of importers can be 
                                                   
17  Other examples of RoOs are the change-in-tariff classification rule, the technical 
requirement/specific process rule, and the wholly obtained rule. 
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correlated with product-level RTA utilization rates. 18 Accordingly, we suppose an 
extreme case where the upper bound of importers’ productivity is infinity, take the shape 
parameter of productivity distribution as given, and consider the case where changes in 
average importer sizes are purely generated by changes in the lower bound of importer 
productivity. As a result, the following corollary is derived: 
 
Corollary 1. Product-level RTA utilization rates in imports are higher for products with 
larger average importer sizes. 
 
Product-level RTA utilization rates are higher when the share of importers that provide 
exporters enough profits to cover the fixed cost of RTA utilization is larger. This is more 
likely to happen when importers’ average productivity is higher. Importer size is found 
to be increasing in its productivity. Thus, average importer size is positively correlated 
with average productivity. As a result, product-level RTA utilization rates for imports 
are revealed to increase in average importer size. 
     Regarding preference margins, the same discussion as per Proposition 2 
straightforwardly provides the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 2. Product-level RTA utilization rates in imports are higher when the 
preference margin is larger. 
 
When the preference margin is larger, more exporters can gain export profits that cover 
the fixed costs for RTA utilization. Taking importers’ productivity as given, a larger 
preference margin enhances the utilization of RTA schemes in each firm’s import 
transactions. Furthermore, owing to lower tariff rates, exporters under RTA schemes 
have larger trade values than those under MFN schemes. As a result, product-level RTA 
utilization rates in imports rise with the preference margin. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
Using the detailed import data for Thailand, which are the same as those used in 
Section 2, this section empirically examines the validity of the above theoretical 
predictions. We first analyze import firm-product-level utilization rates of RTA schemes 
(i.e., Propositions 1 and 2) and then their product-level utilization rates (i.e., Corollaries 
1 and 2). Basic statistics for empirical analysis are provided in Table 3. 
                                                   
18 Appendix A3 provides proofs of corollaries on product-level RTA utilization. 
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===   Table 3   === 
 
5.1. Empirical Framework 
We investigate the determinants of import firm-product-level utilization rates. The 
analysis focuses on one specific export country, which is explained below. Thus, our 
sample dimension is import firm-product-year. To be consistent with our theoretical 
discussion, we estimate the following simple equation: 
𝑈𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝐹𝑖𝐹𝐹−𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑓 = 𝛾1𝑀𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑓 + 𝛾2 ln𝑇𝑜𝑇𝑎𝑑 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑀𝑇𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝑢𝑅𝑃𝑅 + 𝑢𝑓 + 𝜖𝑓𝑓𝑓  (2) 
The dependent variable is import firm-product-level RTA utilization rates, which lie in 
the range of [0, 1]. 𝑀𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑓 represents the preference margin of product p in year t 
and is defined as the difference between MFN and RTA rates, as in most previous 
empirical studies.19 ln𝑇𝑜𝑇𝑎𝑑 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑀𝑇𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑓 is a log of firm f’s total imports of product p 
from the world in year t. As stated in Propositions 1 and 2, the sign on coefficients for 
these two variables should be positive. Section 4 also points out the role of RoOs, which 
is controlled for by introducing RoO dummy variables (𝑢𝑅𝑃𝑅). Year fixed effects (𝑢𝑓) 
capture the effects of year-specific macro shocks such as changes in exchange rates. 
We estimate this model by employing a fractional logit estimation technique 
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) because our dependent variable lies in the 
unit interval. The fractional logit model (FRAC) ensures that, unlike the ordinary 
least-squares (OLS) method, predicted values for the dependent variable are in the unit 
interval. Also, unlike the log-odds ratio model and beta regression model, it can 
naturally define dependent variables for the boundary values 0 and 1. It imposes 
less-restrictive assumptions than the Tobit model, which requires the normality and 
homoscedasticity of the dependent variables (for more details, see Ramalho et al., 2011). 
For comparison purposes, we also estimate our model by OLS. 
We employ the same dataset as in Section 2. In particular, we focus on imports by 
Thailand from Australia during 2007–2009. This aim is to obtain a significant number 
of observations and to avoid analyzing firms’ complicated decisions on tariff schemes. 
In this period, Australia had only one RTA with Thailand, a bilateral RTA that entered 
into force in 2005. On the other hand, for example, Japan has not only a bilateral RTA 
but also a plurilateral RTA with Thailand, particularly from 2009. When multiple RTA 
schemes are available, firms can choose a tariff scheme from among MFN rates, 
                                                   
19 The preference margin is defined in the form of ratio (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗−1) in the theoretical section (i.e., 
Appendix A) mainly for ease of mathematical computation. In the empirical section, on the other 
hand, we use its measure that is most frequently used in the empirical literature, i.e., the difference 
between MFN and RTA rates. 
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bilateral RTA rates, and plurilateral RTA rates rather than simply choosing between 
MFN and RTA rates. We also avoid examining plurilateral RTAs. In this period, for 
example, the other ASEAN member states and China have such RTAs with Thailand. 
However, those include diagonal cumulation rules among several countries. Since our 
theoretical model does not take such rules into consideration, we focus on bilateral 
RTAs. Finally, although India and New Zealand also have single bilateral RTAs with 
Thailand in this period, as shown in Table 1, the number of import observations is too 
small to be empirically investigated. 
 
5.2. Baseline Results 
The estimation results are shown in column “All” in Table 4. This column 
includes all products including those in which RTA rates are the same as MFN rates. We 
cluster standard errors at various levels. In cases of both OLS and FRAC and at any 
level of clustering, both coefficients for Margin and Total Imports are estimated to be 
significantly positive at a 1% significance level. Namely, import firm-product-level 
utilization rates of RTA schemes are higher for products with a larger preference margin 
and when importer sizes are larger in terms of total imports from the world. These 
results are consistent with Propositions 1 and 2 and are unchanged even when excluding 
products in which RTA rates are the same as MFN rates, as shown in column “Positive 
margin.”20 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
    We conduct three types of robustness checks on the above results. First, we 
exclude importers who have positive import values under “other schemes.” This 
exclusion reflects the fact that importers may follow a different decision process 
whenever “other schemes” are available to them. At least, in this case, importers’ choice 
becomes not binary but multiple-choice (i.e., MFN, RTA, and other schemes), unlike 
our theoretical discussion in the previous section. Therefore, we drop the 
above-mentioned importers, i.e., other-scheme users. The results are shown in the 
“Excluding Others” column in Table 5. As in Table 4, we estimate the model for all 
products and products with a positive preference margin. Both cases show the 
significantly positive coefficients on both preference margin and importer size. 
                                                   
20 To save space, we do not report the estimation results in RoO dummy variables, which are 
available upon request. The sample distribution of RoOs is provided in Appendix B. 
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===   Table 5   === 
 
     Second, we restrict sample products only to materials or parts. In the theoretical 
framework, we assumed that intermediate inputs are tradable and final goods are 
non-tradable, and focused on imports of intermediate inputs. Although this assumption 
was merely for simplicity and was not crucial, we estimate only for imports of materials 
or parts to make the empirical analysis consistent with the model setup. Specifically, we 
restrict our analysis to products categorized into 111, 112, 21, 31, 42, and 53 in the 
Broad Economic Categories. The results are reported in the “Materials” column in Table 
5. We again found significantly positive coefficients on preference margin and importer 
size. 
Finally, we introduce various fixed effects in our OLS estimation. The results are 
reported in Table 6. In columns (I) and (II), we add import firm fixed effects. Instead of 
firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, import firm-year fixed effects are introduced in 
columns (III) and (IV). Then, we introduce import firm-year fixed effects and import 
firm-product fixed effects in columns (V) and (VI). We estimate each model for all 
products and products with a positive preference margin. The results show that except 
for column (VI), the estimation results are qualitatively unchanged. Namely, coefficients 
on both Margin and Total Imports are estimated to be significantly positive, consistent 
with Propositions 1 and 2. Owing to our estimation of linear models, it is easy to 
quantitatively interpret our results. For example, column (I) indicates that a 
10-percentage-point rise of preference margin leads to a 3-percentage-point rise of 
firm-level utilization rates. Also, a double (i.e., 100%) increase of importer size raises 
the utilization rates by 0.76 of a percentage point. Namely, the quantitative effect on 
firm-level utilization rates looks trivial in the case of firm sizes, compared with the case 
of preference margin. 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
5.4. Product-Level Analysis 
Next, we investigate the determinants of product-level utilization rates by 
aggregating our firm-product-level dataset to product-level data, i.e., data at an HS 
eight-digit level. This analysis aims not only to test the validity of our theoretical 
prediction in the product level but also to examine the consistency with previous 
product-level studies. On the basis of the aggregated dataset, we estimate the following 
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equation: 
𝑈𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑓 = 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽2 ln𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑓 + 𝑢𝑅𝑃𝑅 + 𝑢𝑓 + 𝜖𝑓𝑓.              (3) 
The dependent variable is product-level RTA utilization rates. As suggested in Corollary 
1, we introduce ln𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑓, which is the log of averaged imports of a given product 
over all sample importers. Its coefficient is expected to be positive. As stated in 
Corollary 2, a larger margin is supposed to lead to higher product-level RTA utilization 
rates. Thus, 𝛽1 is expected to be positive. 
     The estimation results are reported in Table 7. For all products, results from both 
OLS and FRAC show a significantly positive coefficient on Margin, indicating that 
product-level RTA utilization rates are higher for products with a larger preference 
margin. The mean in firm-level imports also has significant coefficients. Consistent with 
Corollary 1, its sign is positive. Namely, product-level RTA utilization rates are higher 
for products with a higher mean importer size. This result is consistent not only with 
Corollary 2 but also with the findings in previous studies on the determinants of 
product-level RTA utilization. 
 
===   Table 7   === 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
While previous theoretical studies have examined exporters’ choice of tariff 
schemes without considering the heterogeneous characteristics of importers, empirical 
analysis of RTA utilization is in general possible only by employing trade data from the 
importers’ side. In order to better link empirical analyses with the theoretical model, this 
paper developed a model that sheds light on the role of heterogeneity among importers 
in RTA utilization additional to that among exporters. Specifically, we introduce 
productivity heterogeneity for both exporters and importers into the model on exporter 
choice of tariff schemes and used the resulting theoretical model to derive some 
propositions. Our main propositions are that import firm-product-level utilization rates 
of RTA schemes are positively correlated with importer sizes and preference margin. 
Similarly, we also demonstrate that product-level utilization rates of RTA schemes are 
higher for products with a larger preference margin and larger average importer size. 
Finally, we found that these theoretical predictions are supported by the highly detailed 
import data for Thai imports from Australia during the 2007–2009 period. 
     Our results have the following policy implication. In public, policy measures for 
exporters have been proposed to enhance the utilization of RTA schemes. In particular, 
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since the major costs of RTA utilization arise in the process of complying with RoOs 
and obtaining CoOs, discussions have considered how to change such processes to 
become more business-friendly. Namely, this discussion concerns how to encourage 
exporters to utilize RTA schemes because exporters basically need to undertake these 
processes. However, our results show that policy measures for importers also have 
potential to enhance RTA scheme utilization in international trade. In particular, we 
theoretically found positive effects arising from importers’ productivity in terms of their 
sizes and RTA scheme utilization rates. Furthermore, consistent with that theoretical 
prediction, it is empirically revealed that importers’ sizes and RTA scheme utilization 
rates are positively correlated. Therefore, policy measures to help importers improve 
their productivity and expand in size should in turn enhance the use of RTA schemes in 
imports. Although these measures for importers are indirect ones in terms of addressing 
RTA issues, they will nonetheless contribute to enhancing RTA utilization in 
international trade. 
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Table 1. Numbers of RTA Non-Users and Users in Thailand’s Imports in 2008 
Number Share (%) Number Share (%)
Australia 10,835 89 1,356 11
China 44,582 81 10,501 19
India 1,220 96 57 4
Japan 91,585 98 1,565 2
New Zealand 1,427 78 401 22
Indonesia 6,613 71 2,679 29
Cambodia 352 91 36 9
Lao PDR 740 88 102 12
Myanmar 1,178 94 69 6
Malaysia 17,747 87 2,704 13
Philippines 3,358 86 529 14
Singapore 31,967 98 590 2
Vietnam 4,213 83 879 17
Non-users Users
 
Source: Authors’ computation 
Note: The table shows the number/share of firm-HS eight-digit observations according to RTA use. 
The export country-product observations are restricted to those in which RTA rates are lower than 
MFN rates. 
 
Table 2. Numbers of RTA Partial Users and Full Users in Thailand’s Imports in 2008 
Number Share (%) Number Share (%)
Australia 376 28 980 72
China 2,719 26 7,782 74
India 17 30 40 70
Japan 994 64 571 36
New Zealand 77 19 324 81
Indonesia 590 22 2,089 78
Cambodia 4 11 32 89
Lao PDR 17 17 85 83
Myanmar 12 17 57 83
Malaysia 802 30 1,902 70
Philippines 182 34 347 66
Singapore 281 48 309 52
Vietnam 184 21 695 79
Partial-users Full-users
 
Source: Authors’ computation 
Note: The table shows the number/share of firm-HS eight-digit observations according to the extent 
of RTA use. The export country-product observations are restricted to those in which RTA rates are 
lower than MFN rates. 
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Table 3. Basic Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Import firm-product-level
Utilization rates 45,971 0.0690 0.2480 0 1
Margin 45,971 0.0738 0.0899 0 2.5971
ln Total Imports 45,971 11.7757 3.3658 0 26.0343
Product-level
Utilization rates 9,655 0.0976 0.2724 0 1
Margin 9,655 0.0735 0.1009 0 2.5971
Mean in firm-level imports 9,655 14.3377 1.6904 5.8406 25.1926  
 
 
Table 4. Firm-Product-Level Regression 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
OLS FRAC OLS FRAC
Margin 0.6909 8.0278 0.724 7.371
Heteroscedasticity-consistent [0.0238]*** [0.2275]*** [0.0302]*** [0.2486]***
Cluster firm [0.0709]*** [0.4767]*** [0.0823]*** [0.5473]***
Cluster product [0.0748]*** [0.5949]*** [0.0889]*** [0.6539]***
ln Total Imports 0.0118 0.1937 0.0166 0.227
Heteroscedasticity-consistent [0.0003]*** [0.0057]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0064]***
Cluster firm [0.0009]*** [0.0165]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0183]***
Cluster product [0.0011]*** [0.0133]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0156]***
Log pseudolikelihood -8705.31 -7663.61
R-squared 0.1449 0.1588
Number of observations 45,971 45,971 34,916 34,916
Positive marginAll
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain various kinds of standard errors. In all specifications, RoO dummy variables in 
addition to year fixed effects are included. “OLS” and “FRAC” indicate that we estimate this model 
by OLS and fractional logit model, respectively. In the “Positive margin” column, we restrict sample 
products only to those with a positive preference margin. 
 
 
 
  
26 
 
 
Table 5. Robustness Checks by Fractional Logit Model: Firm-Product-Level Regression 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Margin 7.7844*** 7.2294*** 11.2457*** 10.8847***
[0.2418] [0.2659] [0.4353] [0.4459]
ln Total Imports 0.1829*** 0.2168*** 0.0626*** 0.0963***
[0.0061] [0.0069] [0.0131] [0.0150]
Product All Positive All Positive
Log pseudolikelihood -7723.02 -6772.54 -1794.58 -1620.57
Number of observations 44,549 33,684 10,653 8,280
Excluding Others Materials
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. In the “Excluding Others” column, 
we exclude importers who have positive import values under “other schemes.” In the “Materials” 
column, we restrict to products categorized into 111, 112, 21, 31, 42, and 53 in the Broad Economic 
Categories. In Product category, “Positive” means that we restrict sample products only to those with 
a positive preference margin. 
 
 
Table 6. Robustness Checks by OLS: Firm-Product-Level Regression 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Margin 0.3117*** 0.3282*** 0.2591*** 0.2909*** 0.3012** 0.2296
[0.0184] [0.0239] [0.0181] [0.0237] [0.1475] [0.1546]
ln Total Imports 0.0076*** 0.0100*** 0.0074*** 0.0097*** 0.0087*** 0.0102***
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0019] [0.0022]
RoO Dummy YES YES YES YES NO NO
Year Dummy YES YES NO NO NO NO
Firm Dummy YES YES NO NO NO NO
Firm-year Dummy NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm-product Dummy NO NO NO NO YES YES
Product All Positive All Positive All Positive
R-squared 0.6329 0.6578 0.7385 0.756 0.9309 0.941
Number of observations 45,971 34,916 45,971 34,916 14,380 10,820  
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. In the “Positive” column, we 
restrict sample products only to those with a positive preference margin. 
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Table 7. Product-Level Regression 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
OLS FRAC OLS FRAC
Margin 0.714 6.6488 0.6676 5.6575
Heteroscedasticity-consistent [0.0595]*** [0.4279]*** [0.0656]*** [0.4560]***
Cluster HS 6-digit code [0.0931]*** [0.5629]*** [0.1023]*** [0.6010]***
Mean in firm-level imports 0.0164 0.1832 0.0283 0.2585
Heteroscedasticity-consistent [0.0018]*** [0.0197]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0232]***
Cluster HS 6-digit code [0.0026]*** [0.0275]*** [0.0036]*** [0.0320]***
Log pseudolikelihood -2374.884 -2075.833
R-squared 0.1565 0.1582
Number of observations 9,655 9,655 7,020 7,020
All Positive margin
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. In all specifications, RoO dummy 
variables in addition to year fixed effects are included. “OLS” and “FRAC” indicate that we estimate 
this model by OLS and fractional logit model, respectively. In the “Positive margin” column, we 
restrict sample products only to those with a positive preference margin. 
 
Figure 1. Density of Partial Utilization Rates in Imports from Australia in 2008 
 
Source: Customs, Kingdom of Thailand  
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Figure 2. Heterogeneous Regime 
 
Note: Author’s computation with the following parameter values: 𝜎 = 4, 𝜈 = 4, 𝑓 = 10, 𝑤 = 1, 
𝜏 = 1.1, 𝑃 = 1, 𝑌 = 1, 𝑥 = 1.3, 𝜃 = 1.15, 𝜇 = 0.85, 𝑓𝑑 = 5, 𝜑𝐿 = 𝑎𝐿 = 1, and 𝜑𝐻 = 𝑎𝐻 = 5. 
 
Figure 3. Heterogeneous Regime with High Value for Lower-Bound Productivity of 
Exporters 
 
Note: Author’s computation with the following parameter values: 𝜎 = 4, 𝜈 = 4, 𝑓 = 10, 𝑤 = 1, 
𝜏 = 1.1 , 𝑃 = 1 , 𝑌 = 1 , 𝑥 = 1.3 , 𝜃 = 1.15 , 𝜇 = 0.85 , 𝑓𝑑 = 5 , 𝜑𝐿 = 4.5 , 𝑎𝐿 = 1 , and 
𝜑𝐻 = 𝑎𝐻 = 5.  
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Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 
 
A1. Productivity and Firm-Level Imports 
Total imports by each importer can be derived in the following manner: 
𝑄𝑗𝑗 = � � �𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖) + 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖)� 𝑑𝑑1
0
𝐽
𝑖=1
. 
We can prove that 
𝜕𝑄𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝑎𝑗
> 0, 
which implies that each firm’s total imports, which we call size of each firm, are 
increasing in its productivity. This is straightforward because both 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖) and 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖) 
are increasing in importer’s productivity as shown above. It is also straightforwardly 
proved that the mean of the size of importers increases with the mean of importers’ 
productivity. 
 
A2. Firm-Product-Level RTA Utilization in Imports (Propositions 1 
and 2) 
Now we move our focus to importer characteristics. We assumed heterogeneity 
not only in exporter productivity but also in importer productivity to reveal the link 
between the latter’s heterogeneity and share of imports under the RTA scheme in total 
imports, which we call RTA utilization rates. To do that, we first derive each final-good 
producer’s total imports of a particular intermediate input under the RTA scheme to 
derive RTA utilization rates in imports at a firm-product level. We assume Condition (1) 
to see the case where multiple tariff schemes are utilized in the trade of given product 𝑑 
between two countries. As discussed in Section A4, an intermediate-good producer 
exports to a final-good producer under the RTA scheme when 𝜑(𝜔) > 𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅≥𝑀(𝑖), or 
𝜑(𝜔) > � 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑
𝑎𝑗
𝜈−1Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈(𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗)−𝜈 − 1� 1𝜈−1. 
Thus, importer 𝑑’s imports of intermediate input 𝑑 from country 𝑖’s exporters under 
the RTA scheme is derived as 
𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖) = � 𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)𝐺(𝜑)𝜑𝐻
�
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑑
𝐴𝑗Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈
�𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗�
−𝜈
−1
�
1
𝜈−1
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= �Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑑
(𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗)−𝜈 − 1
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 �
1+𝛼−𝜈
𝜈−1 (𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗)1−𝜈𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗?̇?𝑗 − � 1𝜑𝐻�1+𝛼−𝜈 �𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗�1−𝜈𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗, 
where 
?̇?𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗1+𝛼−𝜈 and 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 11 + 𝛼 − 𝜈 𝛼(𝜑𝐿)𝛼1 − �𝜑𝐿
𝜑𝐻
�
𝛼 �𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜈
𝜈 − 1𝑤𝑖�1−𝜈 � 1𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗�−𝜈 𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗. 
Thus, total imports under the RTA scheme are revealed to be increasing in importer’s 
productivity (𝑎𝑗). 
     Next, we derive imports under the MFN scheme. An intermediate-good producer 
exports to a final-good producer under the MFN scheme when 𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖) < 𝜑(𝜔) <
𝜑�𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅≥𝑀(𝑖). This condition is rewritten as 
�
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑑
𝐴𝑗Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈(𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗)−𝜈 − 1� 1𝜈−1 > 𝜑(𝜔) > � 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝐴𝑗Ψ𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜈 � 1𝜈−1. 
Thus, importer 𝑑’s imports of intermediate input 𝑑 from country 𝑖’s exporters under 
the MFN scheme is derived as 
𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖) = � 𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖,𝜔)𝐺(𝜑)� 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑𝐴𝑗Ψ𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜈(𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗)−𝜈−1�
1
𝜈−1
�
𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑗Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 �
1
𝜈−1
 
= �� Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 𝑓𝑖𝑗
�
1+𝛼−𝜈
𝜈−1
− �
Ψ𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑑 ��
1
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗
�
𝜈
− 1��1+𝛼−𝜈𝜈−1 � 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗?̇?𝑗 
Thus, total imports under the MFN scheme are revealed to be increasing in importer’s 
productivity (𝑎𝑗). The relation is shown by Figure A1. 
As a result, firm-product-level RTA utilization rates are given by 
𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖) = 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖)
𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀 (𝑖) + 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖).                                           (A1) 
We can prove 
𝜕𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖)
𝜕𝑎𝑗
> 0, 
which implies that firm-product-level RTA utilization rates for imports are increasing in 
importers’ productivity (Proposition 1). Figure A2 depicts the relation between 
importer’s productivity and firm-product-level RTA utilization rates. The effect of 
importer productivity can be decomposed into intensive and extensive margins. When 
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importer’s productivity becomes higher, the importer increases import amounts both 
under MFN and RTA schemes (intensive margin). This effect is captured by 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗 
above. This does not affect 𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖) as impacts through the intensive margin on 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖) 
and 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖)  are same. 21 Also, a part of MFN transactions is switched to RTA 
transactions when importer’s productivity becomes higher (extensive margin). This 
switching is because RTA transactions become more beneficial for exporters that used to 
utilize the MFN scheme. This increases the numbers of RTA-trade partners and RTA 
imports 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖). The improvement of an importer’s productivity scoops up foreign 
intermediate-good producers that did not export to this importer, resulting in an 
increased number of MFN-trade partners. However, this positive effect is partly offset 
by the above switching effect. As a result, 𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖) is found to be increasing in 𝑎𝑗. 
     Furthermore, we can prove the following relation: 
𝜕𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖)
𝜕𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗
< 0. 
This relation implies that firm-product-level RTA utilization rates in imports are higher 
when the preference margin (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗−1 ) is larger (Proposition 2). We also find that 
𝜕𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑅 (𝑖) 𝜕𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗� < 0, which states that firm-product-level RTA utilization rates in imports 
are lower for the more restrictive RTA scheme. The preference margin’s effect can be 
decomposed into intensive and extensive margins. As in the effect of importers’ 
productivity discussed in Proposition 1, the extensive margin is revealed to be the major 
driver of Proposition 2. 
 
A3. Product-Level RTA Utilization in Imports (Corollaries 3 and 4) 
As in existing studies such as Demidova and Krishna (2008), suppose an extreme 
case where 𝑎𝐻 → ∞. In this extreme case, importers’ mean productivity is given by 
𝑀 = 𝛼
𝛼 − 1𝑎𝐿 . 
Thus, the lower bound of importers’ productivity has to rise when its mean rises, taking 
the shape of parameter 𝛼 as given. Further, 𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑅(𝑖) can be rewritten as 
𝑅�𝑗𝑗
𝑅(𝑖) = �1 + 𝜁1 � 1𝑎𝐿�𝜈−1
𝜁2 − 𝜁3
�
−1, 
where 
                                                   
21 Note that 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗 is canceled out in the numerator and denominator in Equation (A1). 
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𝜁1 ≡ ��
𝛹𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 𝑓𝑖𝑗
�
1+𝛼−𝜈
𝜈−1
− �
𝛹𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑑 ��
1
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗
�
𝜈
− 1��1+𝛼−𝜈𝜈−1 �−1 �𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝜈−1
𝜈 − 1 , 
𝜁2 ≡ �
𝛹𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝜈 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑑 ��
1
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗
�
𝜈
− 1�� 𝛼𝜈−1 [𝜑𝐻]𝜈−1
𝜈 − 1 , 
𝜁3 ≡ [𝜑𝐻]𝜈−1 1𝛼 � 𝛹𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜈 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑑 �� 1𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝜈 − 1��
𝛼
𝜈−1 .  
Thus, 𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑅(𝑖) becomes higher when 𝑎𝐿 increases. The average importer size becomes 
larger when average importer productivity becomes higher as importer size is 
monotonically increasing in its productivity. As a result, 𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑅(𝑖) becomes higher when 
the mean importer size becomes higher as stated in Corollary 1. 
We examine product-level RTA utilization rates in imports. Aggregating 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖) 
and 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖) over importers’ productivity 𝑎𝑗, we obtain country 𝑗’s total imports of 
each product 𝑑 from country 𝑖 under each tariff scheme as follows: 
𝑄𝑗𝑗
𝑀(𝑖) = � 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑀 (𝑖)𝑑𝐺𝑎(𝑎)𝑎𝐻
𝑎𝐿
,                                                        
𝑄𝑗𝑗
𝑅(𝑖) = � 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖)𝑑𝐺𝑎(𝑎)𝑎𝐻
𝑎𝐿
= � 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑅 (𝑖)𝑑𝐺𝑎(𝑎)𝑎𝐻(?̇?𝑗𝑅=0) 11+𝛼−𝜈 . 
Thus, product-level RTA utilization rates are given by 
𝑅�𝑗𝑗
𝑅(𝑖) = 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑅(𝑖)
𝑄𝑗𝑗
𝑀(𝑖) + 𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑅(𝑖). 
We can derive the following relation: 
𝜕𝑅�𝑗𝑗
𝑅(𝑖)
𝜕𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗
< 0. 
Analogous to the case of firm-product-level RTA utilization rates represented by 
Proposition 2, this relation implies that product-level RTA utilization rates in imports 
are higher when the preference margin (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑗−1) is larger (Corollary 2). It is also revealed 
that 𝜕𝑅�𝑗𝑗𝑅(𝑖) 𝜕𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑗� < 0, which states that product-level RTA utilization rates in imports 
are lower for the more restrictive RTA scheme. We can apply analogous discussions on 
the intensive and extensive margins that we examined in the case of firm-product-level 
RTA utilization rates.  
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Figure A1. Importer Productivity and Imports under Respective Tariff Schemes 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Importer Productivity and Firm-Product-Level RTA Utilization Rates 
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Appendix B. Sample Rules of Origin in Import Firm-Product-Level 
Analysis 
 
RoOs Freq. Share (%)
CC 5,668 12
CC&RVC 633 1.4
CC&RVC&SP 841 1.8
CH 20,283 44
CH&RVC 1,977 4.3
CH&SP 226 0.5
CS 14,761 32
CS&RVC 607 1.3
CS&SP 13 0.03
RVC 201 0.4
SP 37 0.1
WO 724 1.6  
Notes: “CC,” “CH,” and “CS” indicate change-in-chapter, change-in-heading, and 
change-in-subheading, respectively. “RVC,” “SP,” and “WO” are regional value content rule, 
technical requirement/specific process rule, and wholly obtained rule, respectively. Two or three 
of these rules might be combined. 
 
 
